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Suction Dredging in the United States: Current 






This note reviews the current regulations that exist to mitigate the 
environmental impacts of suction dredge mining both globally and in the United 
States. It begins by discussing suction dredging in the realm of cooperative 
federalism, and whether California’s moratorium will be upheld if a challenge is 
heard in the Supreme Court.1 
It then compares the current regulatory structures in four US states. It 
contrasts the schemes of Oregon and California, which are run by the states, with 
the schemes of Idaho and Alaska, which rely predominantly on the federal 
government for enforcement. This section is followed by a discussion of the current 
lack of enforcement measures of the EPA and argues that these enforcement 
measures are currently better left to the states. 
 Lastly, the final section discusses schemes that have been developed in 
Russia, South Africa, and South America. These countries dredge because of 
economic factors associated with livelihood and violence, whereas in the United 
States dredging is recreational. This note also briefly analyzes how the Russian, 
South African, and South American governments enforce their schemes and why 




Since the early 2000s, the price of gold has been on an upward trajectory in 
the United States.2 With that upward trajectory has come a renewed interest in 
Artisanal and Small Scale Mining (“ASM”).3 A particularly popular type of ASM 
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is called placer mining, or suction dredge mining.4 Essentially, suction dredge 
mining is a large vacuum that floats on top of the water.5 A hose connected to a 
nozzle comes out of the bottom of the machine, where a diver can use it to vacuum 
up the sediment from the water’s bed.6 The water and sediment then go through a 
sluice box where the gold is trapped while the water and other sediment are flushed 
back into the water.7 These machines allow miners to access deposits and areas that 
were unavailable to prospectors of the nineteenth century.8 Additionally, because 
suction dredges are efficient and relatively inexpensive to purchase, the deposits 
do not need to be as rich in gold as they were in the past for miners to make a 
profit.9 
Unfortunately, research suggests that the unregulated use of suction dredges 
can lead to significant environmental harm.10 Suction dredging can interfere with 
fish spawning, negatively alter channel topography, and harm sensitive habitats.11 
Globally, ASM has resulted in massive destruction of the South American 
rainforests, and polluted water sources with dangerous levels of mercury.12 This 
practice has also been associated with criminal syndicates, resulting in human 
displacement, child labor, and armed conflicts.13 
This note seeks to review the current ways governments, both within the 
United States and abroad, are tackling the issues associated with suction dredge 
mining. It begins by reviewing cooperative federalism in the United States, 
followed by looking at the current regulatory practices within the United States—
highlighting the relationship between the states and the federal government. It then 
describes the inadequacies of the federal government’s current regulatory 
practices, followed by reviewing the systems that have been adopted in Russia, 
South Africa, and South America. The note also reviews other countries’ 
regulatory practices to demonstrate what other methods are available, and why they 
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are not appropriate in the United States. Ultimately, this piece recommends that 
states, such as California and Oregon, should continue developing their own 
regulatory schemes and not rely on the federal government for enforcement. 
 
I. Cooperative Federalism as it Pertains to Environmental 
Regulation 
 
Before beginning a review of the current systems in place that regulate 
suction dredge mining at the state level, it is prudent to determine if the states have 
the power to regulate the act in the first place. Mining interest groups rely on a 
strict interpretation of the Mining Act of 1872 (“Act”) to find authority to pursue 
their claims.14 The Act itself allows a private citizen to explore potential mining 
opportunities on federal land, and allows them to perfect a new mining claim by 
properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements.15 Morris 
writes, the Act was “part of [a] larger set of land disposal statutes and it was 
intended to (and did in fact) encourage settlement and economic activity in the 
American West.”16 Before the Act, there was no consistent strategy of licensing 
claims on federal land.17 For example, gold was discovered in California shortly 
after it became an American territory, when it had no official scheme of regulating 
mining claims. The Act was a means of filling the lack of authority for mining 
claims in lands that were territories and not yet states.18 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal laws 
made in conjunction with one of Congress’ enumerated powers can preempt state 
laws.19 The question then becomes whether the Act preempts any state regulation. 
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., a mining company 
protested the California Coastal Commission’s requirement of a permit on federal 
land overseen by the Forest Service.20 The Court held that the Act did not facially 
preempt any regulations that may have been imposed by states on federal land 
authorized by the Act.21 In its analysis, the Court hypothesized that a state 
environmental regulation could become “so severe that a particular land use would 
become commercially impracticable.”22 This language seems to suggest that if a 
 
14. Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1–16, 17 Stat. 91, 91–96 (1872) (current version 
at 30 U.S.C.S. § 22 et seq. (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115–253, approved 10/3/18)). 
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regulation was commercially impracticable, the Secretary of the Interior would be 
able to modify his land use plans under the public lands land policy and 
management statute found in 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).23 The Court concluded by 
noting that state law is only preempted when it conflicts with operation or 
objectives of federal law, or when Congress gives evidence of intent to occupy the 
field.24 
In 2009, California placed a moratorium on all suction dredging activities.25 
In 2012, Brandon Lance Rinehart was cited for operating a suction dredge on 
federal land within California.26 The California Court of Appeal found the 
California dredge moratorium to be “commercially impracticable” as suggested in 
California Coastal Commission.27 The California Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the Court of Appeal—which held the moratorium would be preempted 
if it rendered mining “commercially impracticable”—seeming to ignore the 
“commercially impracticable” issue altogether.28 The court relied primarily on the 
argument that Congress intended to affirmatively preempt the states from creating 
laws that had the effect of regulating mining on federal land.29 The court’s 
avoidance of discussing the “commercial impracticability” found in California 
Coastal Commission is notable. While the case was denied certiorari, in the future 
it will be interesting to see if the Justices decide to define “commercial 
impracticability” and what it means for state environmental regulation. 
Whatever the court’s reason for not discussing commercial impracticability, 
it means that currently in California the moratorium is legal. California and other 
states have begun regulating suction dredging. At the time of writing this, there has 
been no successful preemption challenge to the regulations. 
Another question the Court will have to decide is how far the Tenth 
Amendment should be extended when it comes to a state banning an activity that 
seems to be implied under a Congressional Act like the Mining Act of 1872. Under 
the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”30 Traditionally, conservative members of the Court 
have read this amendment to mean that any power not enumerated in the 
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25. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
26. People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818, 820 (Cal. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 138 S. 
Ct. 635 (2018). 
27. People v. Rinehart, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 562 (Ct. App. 2014). 
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Constitution is reserved for state legislatures, giving them more power to regulate 
things free from the grasp of the federal government.31 
However, there is also a trend among conservative Supreme Court Justices 
of writing opinions in favor of industry and expressing skepticism of 
environmental regulation.32 The question then becomes, how will the conservative 
members of the Supreme Court qualify this disparity? Will they follow their 
ideology and reserve the right of states to regulate how they wish, or will they take 
a pro industry anti-environmental regulatory view and strike down the California 
moratorium as an overreach of the government? Justice Kavanaugh was only 
recently appointed, but all signs point to him being on the far right side of the 
bench.33 Based on his first term, Justice Gorsuch will follow in Justice Scalia’s 
footsteps and be an ideologically conservative Justice, leaving the Court in a 
similar ideological distribution.34 If the question is eventually heard, it will be 
interesting to see the Court’s reasoning for upholding or dismantling a moratorium 
like the one in California. 
 
II. Current Regulations and Penalties in the United States: 




In the United States, suction dredging is regulated both federally and 
locally.35 This section reviews the regulatory systems used in four states where 
suction dredging has been a point of contention: California, Oregon, Idaho, and 
Alaska. The regulatory mechanisms used vary greatly between the states; some are 
completely run by the state, while others are a mix of agencies mainly reliant on 
the federal government for enforcement. 
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Court, SCI. AM. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/WL8S-RQ3W. 
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35. See discussion infra Section II.F. 






Under current law, it is not possible to legally suction dredge mine in 
California.36 In 2009, Governor Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill (“S.B.”) 670, 
which banned suction dredge mining in the state until after the California 
Department of Fish and Wildlife (“CDFW”) could complete a court ordered 
environmental review of its permit program and existing regulations.37 In 2012, the 
CDFW finished the review and concluded that lifting the ban on suction dredging 
would result in significant and unavoidable environmental consequences beyond 
the substantive reach of the CDFW’s regulatory power.38 On April 1, 2013, CDFW 
submitted a subsequent report to the state legislature, with recommendations for 
statutory amendments that would give the CDFW the necessary power to regulate 
suction dredge mining.39 On October 9, 2015, S.B. 637 was signed into law, which 
in part amended California’s Fish and Game Code (“FGC”) to incorporate the 
statutory amendments recommended by the CDFW.40  
The amended section prohibits the CDFW from issuing permits for suction 
dredge mining until certain requirements are met.41 The most significant 
requirement is that before permits can be issued, a regulatory scheme must be 
developed that “fully mitigate[s] all identified significant environmental 
impacts.”42 It is yet to be seen what a regulatory scheme looks like that would 
satisfy this requirement. Judging by how extensive the CDFW’s environmental 
impact report to the state was, the regulatory measures will likely be significant.43 
Because it is currently impossible for the CDFW to issue a permit for suction 
dredging, it is also impossible to suction dredge in California violating the FGC. 
Unless expressly provided otherwise, any violation of the FGC is a criminal 
misdemeanor.44 In California, unless prescribed as otherwise, a criminal 
misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six months, a fine not 
 
36. Suction Dredge Permits, CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE (Oct. 19 2017, 11:08 
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37. S.B. 637, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
38. S.B. 637, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(c) (Cal. 2015). 
39. S.B. 637, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(f) (Cal. 2015). 
40. Cal. S.B. 637. 
41. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5653.1 (2018). 
42. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5653.1(b)(4) (2018). 
43. Findings of Fact of the California Department of Fish and Game as a Lead 
Agency Under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et 
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exceeding $1,000, or both.45 While not as steep a penalty as other jurisdictions,46 it 
is noteworthy that the possibility of jail time exists for an act that was legal with 
an easily obtainable permit just ten years prior.47  
It is clear from the extent of California’s ban and criminal penalties for 
violation thereof, that the state considers the effects of suction dredging to be a 
serious issue. This ban has sparked protest among local mining communities and 
led to the Rinehart cases discussed in the previous section.48 While environmental 
groups are most likely elated by the California ban, the miners’ argument is not 
unreasonable. The ban has been in place for almost ten years now. If developing a 





The dredging moratorium in California (2009) prompted many miners to 
begin operating in Southern Oregon.49 The migration of miners prompted the 
Oregon Legislature to pass S.B. 838 in 2013, which, in part, placed a moratorium 
on suction dredge mining beginning January 2, 2017.50 About 5 months later on 
June 14, 2017, S.B. 3 was signed into law replacing the moratorium with a 
permitting system.51 
Commenting on the legislation, Senator Michael Dembrow (D-Portland) 
said, “[i]t is vitally important to protect endangered and threatened fish species in 
our rivers and streams, but we also recognize that there is a strong mining heritage 
in our state as well.”52 Senator Dembrow’s statement shows the balance of interests 
at heart in Oregon. The temporary moratorium is a result of environmental concern, 
but the eventual lifting of the ban and permitting system is an acknowledgment to 
the people that have been suction dredging in the area for decades. 
S.B. 3 codifies a permitting system which will go into effect January 1, 
2018.53 Section 4(2) of the bill prohibits any suction dredging in any river or stream 
that contains essential indigenous anadromous salmonid habitat.54 This designation 
 
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (2018). 
46. Illegal Mining, CHAMBER OF MINES OF S. AFR. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://perm 
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47. Gold Non-Rush: California Bans Dredge Mining, A. P. (Aug. 8, 2009, 5:22 PM), 
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48. See peoplevrinehart.org (for general history of the case, and the appellants support). 
49. Tracy Loew, Senate Oks Suction Dredge Mining Restrictions to Protect Fish, 




53. S.B. 3, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017). 
54. S.B. 3, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017). 




covers the vast majority of the rivers and streams within Oregon.55 Additionally, 
to qualify for the permit, the inside diameter of the suction dredge hose cannot be 
wider than four inches.56 Typically, a small scale suction dredge hose is between 
two and ten inches.57 Finally, to the extent feasible, the operator must use his 
equipment in a manner that will not harm freshwater mollusks.58 If a person 
operates without a permit, or acts contrary to the requirements of the permit, they 
are subject to a Class A civil violation, which has a maximum penalty of $2,000.59  
Looking between the lines, this legislation appears to balance the interests 
between environmentalists and miners. The ban on mining in waterways that 
contain essential salmonid is a huge win for environmentalists, but the section that 
allows mining near freshwater mollusks is based on a feasibility standard that is 
beneficial to miners. Furthermore, while violation of the statute carries a penalty 
up to $2,000, the legislature decided to make it a civil penalty rather than criminal. 
In comparison to California, Oregon took a less aggressive approach to 
protecting the waterways from suction dredge mining. In the time since California 
placed a moratorium on suction dredging and began researching how to regulate it, 
Oregon has placed a moratorium, lifted it, and set up a system of regulation that 
involves civil rather than criminal penalties. Assuming California’s moratorium is 
eventually lifted and a regulatory scheme is created, it will be interesting to see if 
California’s more aggressive and methodical approach to setting up a scheme will 
ultimately be more effective in reducing the negative impacts of suction dredging 




While Idaho also requires a state permit to dredge, it is relatively simple to 
obtain.60 Authorized under the Stream Channel Protection Act (“SCPA”), the state 
provides maps of state water sources where it is permissible to operate a suction 
dredge.61 The state closes most of the water ways seasonally to protect fish during 
spawning season, and to prevent the introduction of invasive species.62 However, 
a penalty for violating any provisions of the SCPA is only a fine ranging from $150 
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to $500.63 To put that in perspective, just to obtain a permit to suction dredge in 
Idaho requires paying $250.64 Idaho relies mostly on the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) to enforce dredging under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).65 
In Idaho, the EPA issued a general NPDES permit for all suction dredge 
operations.66 The permit has been effective since May 2013, and was recently 
reissued by the EPA.67 The permit specifies that a suction dredge cannot have a 
nozzle wider than five inches, and the equipment must be less than fifteen 
horsepower.68 Additionally, the mining cannot take place in any of the following 
types of waterways: Nationally Protected Areas, Tribal Reservations, National 
Wild and Scenic Rivers, Endangered Species Habitat Areas, Withdrawn Rivers, 
State Protected Rivers, and Impaired Streams.69 
Because NPDES permits get their authority from the CWA, all the penalties 
for violations of the CWA are applicable here.70 The NPDES is designed to punish 
commercial entities as well as private users, so the current maximum penalties are 
quite high. Currently, the maximum civil penalty is $53,484 per day of violation, 
and the criminal penalties for a known violation are a maximum fine of $50,000 
and up to three years imprisonment for a first offense.71 
However steep these potential penalties may be, it is unlikely the EPA’s 
enforcement team would execute such a harsh punishment to a private individual. 
EPA data from October 2013 to September 2016 showed that in Connecticut, of a 
pool of twenty-nine known polluting entities, only two were fined.72 Of the twenty-
nine polluters, thirteen of them exceeded their discharge levels by over 100 
percent.73 The agency commented that while issuing fines is within their authority, 
 
63. Recreational Mining Permits, IDAHO DEP’T OF WATER RES. (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/P84Y-QZAN. 
64. S.B. 637, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(f) (Cal. 2015). 
65. Smith, supra note 59.  
66. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GENERAL PERMIT NO. IDG370000, AUTHORIZATION 
TO DISCHARGE UNDER THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM FOR 
SMALL SUCTION DREDGE PLACER MINERS IN IDAHO (2013). 
67. Id. (original permit); NPDES General Permit for Small Suction Dredge Placer 
Miners in Idaho, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/9WRS-V8H9 
(public notice of proposed reissuance of permit). 
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SMALL SUCTION DREDGE PLACER MINERS IN IDAHO (2013), at 26–27. 
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it is more common to issue notices of noncompliance and warnings, and that the 
sheer volume of monitoring information they receive “far exceeds the capacity of 
department staff.”74 
Even if the EPA did have the capacity to go after individual polluters (or in 
the case of suction dredging, individuals who increased water turbidity), the agency 
relies entirely on self-reporting under this general permit.75 If an individual is 
knowingly violating the NPDES, it seems highly unlikely they would self-report 
their illegal behavior. 
This system is inefficient at best, and ineffective at worst. The EPA 
enforcement agency is already stretched thin and being stretched thinner.76 
Additionally, the penalties under the CWA are designed to target large polluting 
entities, not individuals. It would seem the EPA has little incentive to go after 
individual dredge miners. If the EPA is not going to enforce the NPDES, there is 
no deterrence to keep a dredge miner from not complying with the regulations. 




Obtaining a permit to suction dredge in Alaska is more confusing than the 
other jurisdictions discussed.77 If the proposed location is on state land, the miner 
only needs to purchase an over-the-counter permit and call the Alaska Department 
of Natural Resources to insure she is not mining during spawning season.78 
However, if the proposed mining location is on land owned by any federal agency, 
the miner must obtain a separate permit from the agency.79 The process is 
complicated further because the EPA has delegated regulatory authority to the 
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (“ADEC”), meaning any 
environmental questions that would go to the EPA are now directed to the state.80 
 
74. Gary Stoller, Few Polluters Penalized for Toxic Wastewater Violations, EPA 
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76. See discussion infra Section III. 
77. Fact Sheet Title: Suction Dredging, ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (Feb. 2012), 
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79. Small Scale Mining, ALASKA DEPT’T OF FISH & GAME (Oct. 11, 2018), https://per 
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Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers can recommend the EPA initiate legal 
action for a violation of the CWA.81 
One reason for this piecemeal approach to enforcing a permitting scheme in 
Alaska could be the relatively small number of miners each year. For instance, in 
2013, Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources only processed 207 offshore82 
suction dredge permits.83 Of those, it is estimated that only sixty to eighty were 
actually used.84 Another reason is that the state of Alaska is so large and has so 
many water ways, it is virtually impossible to create blanket rules, and the expert 
advice of the relevant agency will always be required. Regardless, this piecemeal 
approach to issuing permits leads to a less consolidated enforcement agency than 
the other states discussed. 
 
F. Summary and Key Points 
 
Regulatory mining schemes in the United States are either almost entirely 
state regulated as seen in California and Oregon, or a federally dominant hybrid of 
state and federal enforcement as seen in Idaho and Alaska. The state dominated 
regimes benefit from a centrally regulated agency that represents the interests of 
the permitting schemes in effect. Compare these schemes with the one in Idaho, 
where although there is a state permitting agency, the penalties are enforced by a 
separate federal agency. The centrally regulated system seems far more efficient. 
Alaska’s system is the outlier of the group. While it is easy to criticize a piecemeal 
approach as being confusing and inefficient, it is also important to recognize the 
complexities of the state. Alaska is many times larger than any of the other states 
discussed geographically, while being the smallest in population.85 A complex 
regulatory scheme may not be appropriate when local agencies are experts in the 
territory they preside over. 
Oregon’s scheme seems the most effective at this time for two reasons: (1) it 
is centrally regulated by one agency, and (2) the scheme balances the needs of 
constituencies, pleasing both environmentalists and miners. It will be interesting to 
see what regulatory scheme the CDFW determines will be necessary to enforce 
effective mitigation of the environmental concerns identified in California. 
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gov/popclock/?intcmp=home_pop (last visited Dec. 10, 2017 2:26 PM). 




III. EPA Enforcement in the United States 
 
This section of the note discusses whether states like Oregon and California 
should continue developing their new regulatory schemes or allow the federal 
government to enforce illegal suction dredge mining through agencies like the 
EPA. 
It is no secret the Trump administration is not a fan of federal regulation.86 
During a campaign speech in October 2016, candidate Trump declared that seventy 
percent of current regulations should go.87 The anti-regulatory positioning of the 
campaign and early administration have reverberated down through the various 
agencies, including the EPA.88 
Under the Trump administration, EPA enforcement of polluters has declined 
significantly.89 An analysis by the New York Times shows that during the first nine 
months of the administration, the number of EPA enforcement claims was about 
one third fewer than in the Obama administration, and a quarter fewer than in 
George W. Bush administration over the same period.90 The New York Times also 
reports that confidential internal EPA documents show that enforcement slow 
down coincides with policy changes that are favorable to industry.91 The 
documents further show that EPA officers no longer have the authority to 
investigate certain types of pollution without direct permission from headquarters 
in Washington, D.C.92 This last part is particularly troubling for the enforcement 
of illegal dredge mining. In certain states, such as Idaho, the EPA is responsible 
for the enforcement of illegal dredging.93 If the EPA enforcement officers are no 
longer able to act on their own accord, then it is likely regulatory structures that 
rely on the EPA for enforcement will continue to be under enforced. 
The EPA is collecting fewer civil penalties from polluters as well.94 A report 
from the Environmental Integrity Project showed that in the first six months of the 
Trump presidency, about sixty percent fewer civil penalties were collected than in 
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the previous three administrations.95 The EPA’s enforcement of suction dredging 
through the CWA is almost completely based on the distribution of civil penalties. 
If these are being excised at a slower rate, the enforcement of dredging will be less 
comprehensive than it already is. 
The combination of the Trump administration’s policy of anti-regulation and 
weakening of the EPA’s enforcement is a clear indication that the federal 
government is not the best agency to regulate suction dredge mining. California 
and Oregon have showed a forward-thinking interest in protecting the environment 
from suction dredging and should therefore continue to police their own policies. 
The best way to regulate suction dredging in the current political environment is at 
the state level, not the federal level. It is unfortunate that the responsibility of 
protecting clean water, threatened species, and habitat is being marginalized at the 
federal level. However, it is uplifting to see local governments adopt a burden that 
is not necessarily their own, and further study the impacts and solutions to suction 
dredge mining on fragile ecosystems. 
 




In contrast to the United States, most gold dredge mining conducted globally 
is for livelihood, not recreation.96 The International Council on Mining and Metals 
estimates that Artisanal Small Scale Mining (“ASM”) provides livelihoods for up 
to 100 million people.97 Price Waterhouse Coopers estimates that ASM produces 
330 metric tons of gold each year, which accounts for about twelve percent of the 
global market.98 Once melted down and mixed in with legally mined gold, it is 
virtually impossible to trace the gold back to the mine of origin.99 Unlike hard rock 
mining, dredge mining is much more common on a small scale as it requires less 
technical knowledge, and can be done relatively cheaply.100 
There are significant environmental concerns associated with ASM.101 While 
most ASM miners sell their gold unrefined to another party, some use an 
amalgamation process where mercury is vaporized, resulting in health and 
 
95. Valerie Volcovici, Trump EPA Lags Behind in Environmental Enforcement: 
Report, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://perma.cc/7A63-P8BF. 
96. U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Inst. (UNICRI), Rep. on 
Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain, at 25 (May 2016). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 10. 
100. Id. at 23. 
101. Id. at 25.  




environmental issues.102 Amalgamation from ASM is the second worst mercury 
polluter in the world, accounting for twenty-five percent to thirty-three percent of 
all mercury pollution.103 Other hazards include acid mine drainage, improper 
closure of pits and mines, use of toxic chemicals and toxic effluent dumping in 
forest clearings.104 The report illustrates the damage caused: 
 
On the mining aspect, excavating the gold-bearing material has resulted 
in the destruction of large tracks of land. Deforestation, soil erosion, 
alluvial river damage, small dam construction, silting up of water 
streams and rivers, pollution of soil and water and the dumping of 
processed rock and waste are common to most artisanal and illegal 
mining sites. Where the gold-bearing material contains significant 
amounts of sulphides (such as pyrite), acid mine drainage further 
pollutes and destroys the environment.105 
 
In addition to the environmental concerns, there are also serious criminal 
concerns.106 In some countries, armed gangs kidnap other miners and force them 
to work in slave-like conditions.107 Human trafficking has been reported in South 
Africa and Peru.108 Child labor has been reported in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (“DRC”), Peru, Mongolia, South Africa, and Colombia.109 In some 
ASM mines, child labor makes up forty percent of the workforce, and the 
International Labour Organization estimates that as many as one million children 
work in ASM mines worldwide.110 Some of these children have prolonged 
exposure to mercury, which can cause damage to the central nervous system, 
leading to delirium and suicide.111 
In response to the seriousness of the problem, countries have created 
regulatory schemes to address the disparate impacts to the economy, the 
environment, and human rights. The next section of this article will review the 
different structures developed globally, what their motivations were for doing so, 
and why they may or may not be appropriate in the United States. 
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B. South Africa 
 
Following the adoption of a new representative South African government 
in 1994, all previous mineral rights laws were reviewed to represent the inclusion 
of interests of a larger population.112 This initiative led to the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (“MPRDA”).113 In part, the 
MPRDA has new requirements that focus on, “financial resources, technical 
ability, environmental concerns, social and labor, as well as health and safety 
provisions.”114  
The MPRDA states that its purpose is to promote advancement of economic 
opportunities for historically disadvantaged people, as well as provide for the 
security of prospecting and mining operations.115 The MPRDA defines an illegal 
act as any action to remove minerals or attempt to conduct technical operations 
without environmental authorization and the appropriate permit.116 
South Africa also polices illegal mining through the Second Hand Goods Act 
(“SHG”) and a sophisticated border control mechanism.117 The SHG attempts to 
regulate illegal activity when the metals are changing hands with a merchant, after 
it has been mined.118 
 
1. Environmental Authorizations 
 
All environmental authorizations must fall within the environmental 
principles described in the National Environmental Management Act 
(“NEMA”).119 Similar to the United States, South Africa requires that local 
branches of the national government to create environmental implementation plans 
unique to their region.120 Any environmental authorization given to a private party 
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must fall within the confines of the environmental plan.121 NEMA also requires 
that any loss of biological diversity is avoided, or minimized and remedied.122 The 
costs of remedying any pollution or loss of biological diversity is paid for by the 
responsible party.123 Any violation of NEMA is subject to criminal proceedings 
brought by the state.124 Curiously, NEMA also extends legal standing to any private 
party that wishes to bring an action in the interest of the public, or in the interest of 
protecting the environment.125 This mechanism of allowing a private party to bring 
an environmental action is frankly astonishing. In the United States, acquiring 
standing in an environmental suit is a significant hurdle.126 Allowing a private 
individual to sue in the interest of protecting the environment is a powerful idea 
that could have a significant impact in the field of environmental law. 
Unfortunately, while the number of environmental prosecutions under NEMA has 
risen recently, there is not one reported case of someone bringing a private 
action.127 
 
2. Second Hand Goods Act 
 
The purpose of the Second Hands Goods Act is to combat illegal trade in 
stolen goods and promote ethical standards in the trade of second hand goods.128 
Part of the act requires dealers that recycle controlled metals (such as gold) to 
register as a recycler.129 The metals themselves must also be registered, and if a 
recycler has suspicion to suspect that the metals have been acquired illegally, the 




Under the MPRDA, any authorized person may make a routine inspection of 
a mining operation without a warrant.131 Penalties for violating the act range from 
fines of 10,000 to 500,000 rand (approximately $700 USD to $35,000 USD as of 
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November 2018), and prison sentences range from six months to ten years.132 The 
most severe penalties are reserved for violations of the environmental management 
provisions.133 If convicted of an offence under the Second Hand Goods Act, the 
person may be subject to up to thirty days in prison and a fine.134 
The laws of South Africa seem to have two main purposes: 1) to protect the 
environment through steep penalties, and 2) to regulate illegal trade of metals 
without harming the livelihood of the participants. This approach steers clear of 
penalizing the individual ASM miners, focusing on big polluters, and the 




In Russia, mining of all precious metals is regulated under the Federal Law 
on Precious Metals and Gemstones 1998.135 The law gives the state the authority 
to regulate all transactions related to precious metals and gemstones.136 Standards 
are set for each stone based on what the state determines is an appropriate amount 
that should be available on the market at any given time.137 The law gives the state 
the authority to set up a system of administrative courts to adjudicate any 
violations.138  
While the law itself gives comprehensive authority to the state, industry 
insiders emphasize that violations are not strictly enforced.139 For instance, 
although there are still Soviet era rules that completely prohibit the trading of gold 
bars anywhere outside of a state-owned bank, it is common to buy bars outside of 
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banks with little to no prosecution.140 The law itself is designed to regulate large 
scale operations, not the activities of ASM miners.141 
In Southern Siberia, there is little to no government enforcement of suction 
dredge mining.142 Local environmentalists are taking the initiative to combat the 
mining by documenting where it is happening and putting together a case for local 
prosecutors.143 The fact that local environmentalists are putting together cases 
outside of the government demonstrates a tremendous lack of enforcement. These 
efforts may be in vain, as the current politics of Russia are opposed to 
environmental enforcement.144 It seems that without the political will, the mining 
regulations that do exist in Russia are toothless. 
  Currently, the biggest attractor for ASM miners is in Baltic Sea amber, not 
gold.145 It is popular in the region as jobs are hard to come by, and digging for the 
amber is much more lucrative than the jobs that do exist.146 The Baltic Sea region 
is rife with reports of corrupt officials and police that look the other way when 
finding illegal amber mining.147 Officials are suspected of being paid by local crime 
syndicates to allow the activity to continue.148 The penalties are also relatively 
light, resulting in a small fine and confiscation of equipment.149 The lack of 
government enforcement in both the Baltic Sea regions and Southern Siberia 
demonstrate a gap in Russia’s regulatory structure. An outdated regulatory scheme 
that does not seem concerned with ASM miners is ineffective and undesirable. 
 
D. Colombia and Other South American Countries 
 
In Colombia, ninety percent of all mines are unlicensed.150 Armed militia 
groups have found their way into the trade, and have had a “positive and 
significant” effect on murder rates in the areas in which they operate.151 A common 
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issue is the displacement of indigenous peoples from their lands.152 In 2012 alone, 
up to eighty people of the Yanomami tribe were reported to have been killed while 
resisting displacement by local illegal miners in Venezuela.153 
The environmental impacts have also been severe: A research team found 
that in one region, some thirty to forty tons of mercury are poured into local rivers 
each year.154 Seventy-eight percent of the local population had a mercury 
concentration three times the average.155 In the region of Choco more than 19,000 
hectares of the rainforest have been destroyed from local mining.156 
The government responded by creating a 500-man militarized unit.157 The 
main tactics include arresting those that are mining and destroying their 
equipment.158 A local think-tank believes the strategy is having little to no effect, 
and the illegal mining and environmental devastation will continue virtually 
unchecked.159 
A militarized force similar to the one in Colombia is also active in Peru.160 
Experts say the environmental damage done by illegal mining in Peru is far more 
destructive than what is done by the mining companies.161 In less than a year, the 
Tambopata reserve went from being virtually untouched, to all but destroyed by 
illegal mining.162 The government has responded with military raids, attempting to 
coerce miners to leave the illegal mining camps by force.163 But the marines 
involved in the raids are ill equipped, and critics are skeptical of their actual 
effect.164 
A study from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 
claims that the increased involvement of criminal syndicates in illegal gold mining 
is displacing local populations, and facilitating child labor and sexual 
exploitation.165 The study found illegal activities in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
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Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela.166 Such far-reaching 
criminal activity explains why Colombia, Peru, and other Latin American countries 
resort to using military force. 
The environmental devastation and violence from illegal mining in South 
America is unmatched in the other jurisdictions discussed. It is difficult to criticize 
a regulatory scheme when there are factors present that make administrative 
remedies seem almost comical. The governments have initiated military operations 
to curve the devastation, and they are having little impact.167 If any regulatory 
scheme is to be effective, the situation needs to be under government control first. 
It is inappropriate to criticize the activities of these governments in a situation that 
is as violent and complex as the one in South America. 
 
E. Comparing Global Regulatory Schemes in the United States 
 
Based on cursory research, global regulatory schemes seem to fall into three 
categories: (1) light civil enforcement, as seen in South Africa; (2) codified, but 
not enforced regulation, as seen in the Russian Federation; and (3) heavy 
militarized enforcement, as seen in Colombia. 
In South Africa, the most severe penalties are saved for environmental 
infractions, while laws that regulate small transactions, such as the Second Hand 
Goods Act, have relatively small penalties. One of the fundamental principles of 
the MPRDA is to “substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for 
historically disadvantaged persons.”168 The principles in the act demonstrate a 
commitment to helping people mine sustainably while promoting their economic 
and social welfare.169 
Compare the fundamental principles of the MPRDA with the militarized 
enforcement of Colombia, and it becomes quickly apparent how important the 
driving factors for the regulation are. In all three of the countries reviewed, the 
driving force for the mining is livelihood, not recreation, as seen in the United 
States. The limited resources and high cost of living make it impractical to rely on 
suction dredge mining as a means of living within the United States. Because the 
driving force of suction dredging in the United States is recreation, the regulatory 
laws and penalties should be tailored to fit those interests and not ones based on 
livelihood. 
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A large part of the reason the violence around mining exists in Colombia is 
because of a lack of other economic opportunity.170 When the issue at hand is 
survival, the laws and rules of the region become less important to the individual 
actor. In these situations, government and military intervention may be appropriate. 
However, when the driving force behind the illegal activity is recreation, not 
survival, these drastic measures are excessive and inefficient.  
For these reasons, this paper argues that if the United States is to look to 
another country’s regulatory scheme for inspiration it should mirror the MPRDA 
of South Africa. The purpose should be to efficiently manage the industry of ASM, 
while heavily penalizing any damage to the environment. Heavy environmental 
penalties that are well enforced deter recreational miners from engaging in illegal 
behavior while still promoting the activity itself. If miners in the United States are 
not relying on gold for their livelihood, the moral question shifts from hurting a 
person’s ability to sustain themselves, to protecting the natural world from 
unnecessary destruction. Criminal penalties and militarization to enforce suction 
dredge mining in the United States are not appropriate, but what is fitting is 




In conclusion, states such as California and Oregon should continue to 
develop their own suction dredging regulatory programs and not rely on the federal 
government for enforcement. California and Oregon should also continue to study 
the impacts that suction dredge mining has on local ecosystems, and carefully 
monitor environmental impacts. 
If the Court decides to hear a case concerning state regulation of suction 
dredge mining, it will be interesting to see if they decide to pick up the “commercial 
impracticability” standard that was not addressed by the California Supreme Court 
in People v. Rinehart.171 There is also the question of whether the conservative 
members of the Supreme Court will recognize the states’ rights to regulate suction 
dredging under the Tenth Amendment, or rule against regulation as an intrusion 
into federal power. 
After reviewing the global regulatory schemes found in Part IV of this paper, 
the United States should adopt the heavy environmental fines found in South 
Africa. Steep environmental penalties send the message that it is okay to participate 
in regulated activity, but operating in a way that harms the environment is not 
acceptable. Severe criminal penalties and military intervention are not appropriate 
in the United States because the activity here is recreational in nature. 
 
170. Ebus, supra note 155. 
171. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 558–59. 




It is necessary to develop enforced suction dredging regulatory programs in 
the United States because the environmental impact of unregulated dredging is 
simply unacceptable. If suction dredge mining continues to grow in popularity and 
the activity is unchecked, it could have devastating impacts on threatened and 
endangered fish and their habitats. Legislatures should take a hard look at the 
environments effected by these activities and look to California and Oregon as 
examples for creating enforced, robust, regulatory programs. 
